DPRU RESEARCH PAPERS
prisoners. For example, in April 2019 the then
penalty
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad
negotiations and which intersects with internal
Zarif, stated:
power struggles.79
All these people that are in prison inside the
United States, on extradition requests from the
United States, we believe their charges are
phony. The United States believes the charges
against these people in Iran are phony. Why?
Let's not discuss that. Let's have an exchange.
I'm ready to do it. And I have authority to do it.76
There have been allegations that the Iranian
government sought to exchange Ahmadreza Djalali,
currently on death row, for Iranian envoy Assadollah
Assadi. In February 2021, Assadi was sentenced to
20 years in prison in Belgium for orchestrating a
bomb
attempt targeting
the 2018
annual
convention of major oppositional party, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran, which is
based in Paris.77 Iran Human Rights reported
allegations that Belgium and Sweden both refused
to exchange Assadi for Djalali, although there are
separate concerns that Iran might seek to detain
further Europeans for continued pressure to
78
swap.
This group of dual Iranian nationals receives the
majority of international attention and lobbying.
Their cases are often the most well-publicised,
being picked up by Western media, discussed by
prominent politicians and attracting thousands of
signatures from civil society NGOs. This is despite
the vast majority of foreign national prisoners
coming from Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iraq, rather
than Western countries. Dual Iranian nationals,
therefore, represent a fraction of the overall death
row population in Iran and yet play a pivotal role in
Iran’s political landscape. This dynamic contributes
to the heavy ‘death penalty diplomacy’ in use in Iran
and the important ‘political capital’ of the death
which
Iran
uses
for
international
CONCLUSION
This analysis has sought to map the political
undercurrents of capital punishment in the Islamic
Republic of Iran and in particular how dual and
foreign nationals are discriminated against within
that. The external political functions of the death
penalty include suppressing the ‘cultural threat’ of
cross-border drug trafficking, achieving more
negotiation power in the face of increasingly
restrictive sanctions, seeking reciprocal prisoner
swaps or demanding recompense for outstanding
multinational debt. The internal functions include
quashing protests against the regime, suppressing
separatist movements, or even just ‘otherness’,
that might threaten the Iranian nation-state or
citizen archetype.
As these political economic factors ebb and
flow, it is evident that those facing disadvantage
across foreign national and intersectional lines face
the death penalty disproportionately, particularly
foreign nationals from Afghanistan, Iraq and
Pakistan, and minority ethnic and/or religious
groups (especially those who are Sunni Muslim,
Baha’í, Kurdish or Baluchi). In addition, although only
representing a fraction of the overall population of
death row, the arbitrary detention of dual Iranian
nationals has a disproportionate political function
for the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, they also
receive disproportionate coverage by Western
press, lobbyists and advocacy groups. Without
doubting the very real pains for this group, it is
crucial to remember the significant ‘other’ cohort
and investigate their particular vulnerabilities.
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