DPRU RESEARCH PAPERS 1,000 [million tonnes of] opium and 140 mt heroin that they were targeted because of their efforts to flow into the Islamic Republic of Iran via these support Kurdish self-determination, and not, or not 36 borders,” which are “1,845 km long and consist of mainly mountainous or harsh desert terrain.” 37 A 2013 Afghan parliamentary delegation reported that there were between 1,200-4,000 Afghan nationals on death row in Iran, 38 although purely, due to the charges on their indictments. Hence, we can see that both foreign nationality, but also, perhaps more crucially in Iran, ethnicity and religion play a large part in determining who is most at risk of the death penalty in the country. there is reason to believe that this number has Across every retentionist jurisdiction, two drastically declined in the wake of the 2017 Anti- things become immediately apparent: due process Narcotics Law reform. In response to the violations are inherent to the apparatus of capital mobilisation of Afghan civil society, the Afghan punishment; Government urged its Iranian counterpart to stop disproportionately afflicted by these procedural executing Afghan nationals. 39 and the most vulnerable are Whilst this, in failures. Foreign nationals are a particularly conjunction with the reform of drug laws, has vulnerable group, facing a range of practical undoubtedly led to a reduction in the number of difficulties. Firstly, foreign nationals on death row in Afghan some Iran are likely to be unfamiliar with the legal system commentators note that it is also likely to have and their ancillary rights, such as the right to encouraged particular secrecy for those executions consular access under the Vienna Convention nationals being executed, 40 that do still go ahead. Given the Taliban takeover (whether or not this is granted is another matter).42 of Afghanistan in August 2021, it is likely that They are unlikely to receive adequate legal support intergovernmental negotiations on this will not or assistance, particularly as they are isolated from continue. protective networks of families or friends. This is Pakistani nationals are the second biggest cohort of foreign nationals sentenced to death in Iran. Moreover, a response from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that they currently had 102 Pakistani prisoners, either sentenced or held on remand, for various offences. It should be noted that Pakistan is another major drug producing country which uses Iran as a corridor to Europe.41 However, many of those sentenced to death are also members of the Sunni Baluch ethnicity, which borders Iran and Pakistan. Baluchis (both Iranian and Pakistani) are often arrested and subsequently sentenced for being involved in what is seen as anti-Iranian activity. All of those sentenced to death from Iraq, Syria and Turkey were Kurdish. There is some evidence particularly important in the context of the payment of blood money or diya, as the defendant does not have access to local financial support networks.43 Furthermore, this isolation compounds with their likelihood of being of lower socioeconomic status, ensuring that the ability to pay a diya becomes the ‘luxury of the rich.’44 They are also unlikely to speak Farsi, significant insofar as Hoyle notes for foreign nationals generally that, “the inability to speak the dominant language becomes blameworthy and a tangible marker of difference.”45 This can be compounded by the Iranian regime’s prosecutorial preference for forced signed confessions, which not only violates both Articles 14 and 7 of the ICCPR, but is also often demanded in a language the defendant is unable to read or write.46 6